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Loving Art  
Tim Stott 
 
The primary directive of Irish art criticism at present seems to be to launch artists, works, and critics onto the high seas of legibility, legitimacy and 
exchange. This puts interpretation in the service of promotion and general arts management, certainly, but rather than seeking to counter this with 
belaboured wrangling over meaning, the time is ripe for a little love, perhaps. Insofar as it stakes a claim to meaning, criticism continues to engage in 
the broadly hermeneutic process of recovering and disclosing for an interpretive subject the latent meaning of a complex of significant qualities. The 
task of interpretation is to cast a net across these qualities, then to describe and decipher what is brought ashore. Such a method of intellectual labour, 
whatever the flag under which it ventures out, finds meaning only in the depths. 
Some time ago, Susan Sontag lamented “the revenge of the intellect upon art”, for laying siege to the sovereignty of the sensuous and immediate: 
hence, her call for an erotics of art, which would begin with “a really accurate, sharp, loving description of the appearance of the work of art … 
[revealing] the sensuous surface of art without mucking about in it”. Writing must therefore become transparent so that through it we might 
experience “the luminousness of the thing itself, of things being what they are.”1 Otherwise, the assimilation of Art into Thought would only further 
atrophy our sensory correspondence with the world. 
Sontag rightly objects to interpretation that chases after some originary experience from which to proceed, but her own recommendations remain 
entangled both within her phenomenological prejudice for the “luminous” origins of things, and the more general hermeneutic project of resuscitating 
“the living spirit from the tomb of the letter”2, which most often entails the reconfiguration of a dissolute subjectivity irreversibly detached from and 
through writing. Nevertheless, however confused and reactionary her case against interpretation might be, her call for erotics is germane to the 
problems of artwriting in its encounters with the current array of art pleasures. 
But first, transparency. To demand transparency of writing, to demand that it become merely a deficient conduit for the evidence of the senses, and 
that it encounter something latent to which it does not and cannot contribute, is once again to assume that the world already murmurs with meaning 
that our statements about it make more or less audible, as well as to further corral the movements of writing within the propositional and descriptive. 
However much these latter might more vigorously attend to sensuous surfaces, it would be foolish to imagine that such operational and vehicular uses 
of writing could be anything but inadequate to the intricacies and intense peculiarities of the sensory. But the statements of which writing consists are 
also speculative, agitating what is unwritten.3 Agitation is not the same as criticism, and much more like those crises upon which criticism nourishes 
itself, a crisis being, after all, neither more nor less than a moment of decision.  
Such a demand also suffers from an aversion to a number of rather important things about writing. Firstly, as much as it compels, and courts 
authority, writing is anarchic and duplicitous, inescapably so. Secondly, writing too is a sensuous surface of inscription: when Sontag calls for the 
writer’s body to become an open, yielding surface for the inscription of sensory data, she simply transfers the origin from artwork to body, thereby 
disavowing those more or less automated operations that constantly inscribe upon this body and distribute its sense-making functions across a 
multitude of technological sub-systems, writing being one of them. Thirdly, writing dramatises knowledge, making it festive.4 As writing wriggles 
away from the grip of legislation and power, it approaches theatre, and so too approaches the object of its musings and desires, its beloved, so to 
speak, with a performance – parades of masks and gestures, games of hide-and-seek:  
“Larvatus prodeo: I advance pointing to my mask, but with a discreet (and wily) finger I designate this mask. Every passion, ultimately, has its 
spectator … no amorous oblation without a final theatre …”5 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, whilst there is no homology between the sensible and the articulable, whilst visibilities and statements, for 
example, are heterogeneous, both exceed the conditions from which they derive: as Gilles Deleuze suggests, one cannot open up words without 
visibilities emerging in response, and vice versa.6 This opening up and proliferation of statements is precisely the literary quality of writing from 
which the guardians of transparency seek to distance themselves, in order to strike the pose of criticality.  
The previous points are by now almost poststructuralist commonplaces, of which, of course, Sontag can have been only dimly aware, if at all. But 
again, Sontag is not really the target here: transparency, interpretation and criticism remain inseparable for many. An aversion to literariness – often 
conflated with the belle lettriste – prevails, still, even where aspirations surpass the lacklustre treadmill of promotional stock. The demand for 
transparency is persuasive, and commonly a default option. It is timely and efficient. It works to deadlines. It uses predictive text formations, but in 
doing so makes language redundant at the moment of writing. Whatever declarations such texts might make concerning their exegetic function, they 
foreclose the movement of text, measuring out the rhythms of syntax according to representational dictates. The generally muddled thoughts and 
grouchy admonishments that accompany this hangover from the politics of representation seem unwilling to entertain the possibility that art is 
representative only in a weak sense, if at all, and as a means by which society represents itself it is largely irrelevant.7 If this is the case for the 
presumed objects of criticism, then why attempt to institute representation at the level of the text? This seems a rearguard action, a commitment to 
circulate words according to the Law, and not according to the perversities of writing itself. 
The demand for erotics is more difficult, and strictly incompatible with the demand for transparency, implying as it does the perverse act of making 
what is intimate public, with all its inexplicable associations and pleasures intact. It has found its most sustained response, so far, in various appeals to 
beauty.8 However, such appeals continue to depend uncritically upon a hermeneutic subject (as well as an uncomplicated distinction between the 
‘truths’ of the body and the tall tales of the text); and besides, erotics begins in the vicissitudes of pleasure, not in the placatory certainties of beauty. 
Lovingly following the contours of the body that arouses its desire, allowing its pleasure to accumulate upon the body’s surfaces until it becomes 
visible, writing approaches intimacy with that strange, chimerical body. The “thing itself” is a fantasised origin that is just a place from which to 
begin. It is already dense with words, a glut of quotations, but reading and writing this surface is quite unlike the linear conventions of the page: 
“It starts at any point, skips, repeats itself, goes backwards, insists, ramifies in simultaneous and divergent messages, converges again, has moments 
of irritation, turns the page, finds its place, gets lost.”9 
So again, it is not a case of poetic evocation, of chasing language away from that phantom thing called “immediate experience”, or of laying down a 
text before the non-conscious, and piously backing away. This is where the merchants of beauty have it wrong, of course, allowing no prospects for 
writing other than as the allegory of its own failure – “the beautiful and maddening … failure of language in the face of anything but itself.”10 At the 
irregular limit where blind words encounter mute visions, a lover’s discourse does not respect the integrity of bodies. Instead, it takes its failure for 
the beginning of an affair, elaborating another sensuous surface and forming statements comparable in intensity and singularity to the enigmatic 
rhythm that holds it captive, impatient to move towards and prolong the intensity, if not the primacy, of such an encounter. It takes the singularity that 
emerges from a breakdown in communications as the only reliability; “everything else is deceptive”, K is told in Kafka’s The Castle. Such is its 
catastrophe, and the scandal of its pleasures: that it is constantly disturbed and impassioned by singular, irrevocable encounters that haunt it but which 
it fails to address directly. It finds only uncommunicative traces of other bodies inscribed within its own, and thereby becomes a stranger to itself. 
However, writing’s failure becomes fatal at those points where it seeks to be representative of something quite foreign to it or where it functions only 
to signpost the proprietary rights of meaning. These are both acts of possession quite inimical to those of love. 
Without doubt, there are obligations for artwriters, but beyond these, they should risk greater ambition, and greater intimacy, than the narcissism of 
magnificent failure: this only leads each party to fall back into itself, whereas erotics, after all, requires the opening of two bodies to each other. It 
requires a gift, and the “right density of abandonment” that entrusts one body to another and vice versa, and that animates both outside any particular 
frame of interpretation, “as if the [erotic] image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see.”11 
Writing not contracted to the laborious recovery of meaning might engage instead in something akin to an overseas correspondence. As Maurice 
Blanchot famously wrote long ago, if there were not this interval, the remoteness and enigmatic silence of one correspondent to another even as they 
face each other, nothing would pass between them. 
“We should renounce knowing those to whom we are bound by something essential … the movement of understanding in which, speaking to us, they 
reserve, even in the greatest familiarity, an infinite distance, this fundamental separation from out of which that which separates becomes relation.”12 
The generosity of such an attempt to exchange addresses is a consequence of writing’s aforementioned failure to reach its address. There never is an 
amorous encounter through writing: hence, for Barthes, there can be no “amorous” text, only writing “amorously.”13 But, failure is the source of 
generosity, as it sends writing beyond mere autoeroticism and into the mutual vulnerability of erotics: masturbation, the augmentation and bringing to 
climax through writing of a previous encounter is much too authoritative – it short-circuits erotics and introduces some retrograde voluntarism into 
affairs. One does not choose to love, one falls in love: love is something we are in rather than something we do, a by-product of our well-laid plans. A 
lover’s discourse gets carried away in the movements of Eros:  
“Straining towards something different from ourselves, we had been penetrated by something we already carried within us. But it was also as if it 
were only by entering us that the work could know itself … These are hardly attributes of a personality; we are pregnant with what doesn’t exactly 
belong to us, and self-delivery (self-reproduction) turns out to have nothing to do with self-expression.”14 
To conclude, a few requests. Firstly, that artwriting attempts not to recover some present prior to writing but to live restlessly in the present through 
writing. Secondly, that it transcribes the incomprehension that engenders love. Thirdly, that it takes its motivation from the voluptuous density of 
relations between lovers and seeks knowledge neither in the lover nor the beloved but only in what passes between them. And lastly, that it does not 
engage in gossip: loving consists of believing that one knows the secret the loved one holds back, even as one knows that such secrets only come into 
being in response to one’s probing. Can we think of a writing that keeps that secret rather than attempts to spread it around? For how can we love if 
we cannot keep a secret?  
“And this secret that we take by surprise, we do not speak of it; we keep it. That is to say … we do not touch it … we leave it intact. This is love.”15 
Similarly, one should not write of an encounter, for fear of betraying its secret, or worse, revealing that it has no secret. One can write to this 
encounter, but at the expense of clarity for those who are not party to it. Hence the use of opaque jargon, the distribution of the vernacular in the midst 
of the vehicular, which lacks clarity only to those who perform the ablutions of legitimate and/or critical discourse. 
If artwriting cannot trade in silences and secrets then it can only trade, i.e. become a mere function of logistics; and it certainly cannot love. 
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